This thesis examines the practice of corruption by regional heads in the administration of regional autonomy in Indonesia, focusing on the relationship between the expansion of regional authority, patterns of political patronage, and regional financial management. This study employs a normative legal research method using statutory, conceptual, and case approaches to examine the authority of regional heads and the mechanisms for supervising the implementation of regional autonomy. Based on an analysis of various legal provisions and practices of regional governance, it is evident that the administrative, political, and fiscal authority concentrated in regional heads provides considerable discretion in the decision-making process. Under certain conditions, when such authority is not balanced by adequate supervision and accountability mechanisms, the potential for abuse of power may arise, particularly in the management of regional budgets, government procurement of goods and services, and the formulation of strategic policies at the regional level. Corrupt practices involving regional heads do not merely constitute individual misconduct but represent a structural phenomenon influenced by high political costs and patronage relationships between regional heads and political and economic actors at the local level. These conditions may result in losses to regional finances, declining quality of public services, and weakening public trust in regional governments. Therefore, this thesis emphasizes that combating corruption by regional heads cannot rely solely on repressive law enforcement, but also requires strengthening checks and balances mechanisms, reforming regional governance, and improving the local political system so that the implementation of regional autonomy remains aligned with the principles of accountability and the public interest.